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
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

A NATO Mission to Moscow

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A NATO MISSION TO MOSCOW



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On 5-6 October, NATO will hold a high-level session of the North Atlantic Council to decide on the next allied move toward East-West negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions. Since the NATO ministerial in Lisbon last June, the allies individually have been probing Soviet and East European attitudes in the wake of Brezhnev's positive reply last spring to NATO's proposals on force reductions. The NATO countries now are prepared to advance the East-West dialogue and will appoint retired Secretary General Brosio to visit Moscow and other interested capitals to present current allied thinking and seek out further Soviet views.

The high-level meeting will also consider the readiness of the alliance to enter negotiations if the explorer's mission is successful. At this point, much remains to be done. The allies have not determined their position on such questions as what types of reductions would be acceptable, what risks would be involved, what forms of verification would be advisable, or what to do about nuclear warheads, delivery systems, or tactical aircraft. The European allies realize that they can do little until the US provides a lead on these points; their concern will intensify if the pace of detente politics continues to quicken and pressures grow on the NATO foreign ministers, who meet in December, to take a definite stance on force reduction negotiations.

Background

Moscow pushed the idea of force reductions in Europe as a self-serving diplomatic device in the 1950s. By 1965, the Soviets had dropped the issue, partly because they hoped for unilateral US reductions and partly because they feared an accusation, particularly from the Chinese, that mutual cuts would enable the US to shift troops to Vietnam.

NATO's own proposals for mutual and balanced force reductions have their genesis in the soul-searching examination of the alliance that culminated in 1967 in the Harmel Report. This report recommended that NATO, in addition to maintaining its chief function of providing for the defense of the West, take on a second function of promoting detente with the East. In approving the report, the allies pledged themselves to intensify the study of arms control measures. In

June 1968, the allied foreign ministers issued a statement intended as a signal to the Soviet Union of allied interest in mutual force reductions. The signal was repeated at the semi-annual NATO ministerial sessions in 1969, even though Moscow had shown no interest in the subject since 1965.

In 1969, the NATO staff began to work on "models" of various reduction formulas. The models were to serve as a basis for NATO consideration of whether a given approach that would preserve allied security would also be negotiable. The exercise revealed how difficult it might be to harmonize these requirements, and it helped the allies to recognize some of the problems that would lie ahead were the Soviets to take up NATO proposals.

In May 1970, the foreign ministers reiterated in Rome their interest in exploratory talks on force reductions, but they specified four criteria

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on which their offer rested. These four points have become known as the Rome Criteria, and remain basic to NATO's position.

By the next month, Moscow's continued silence on force reductions, hardly in keeping with its attempt to project a detente image, apparently had become tactically disadvantageous for the Kremlin. Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies, meeting after the NATO ministerial, finally responded. The response was couched in terms carefully relating force reduction talks to the Soviet proposal for a Conference on European Security. The pact communiqué professed an Eastern interest in discussions concerning "reducing foreign armed forces on the territory of European states."

The Soviet response was viewed with skepticism in NATO. Many allies suspected that it had been forced by Moscow's concern for its international image. The tie-in with a security conference led them to question whether the Soviets had a real interest in opening a serious dialogue on force reductions. The allies concluded, however, that they could not afford to treat lightly the East's offer on foreign forces. At their ministerial session in December last year, the NATO countries announced that they were ready to explore the possibility of reductions in stationed (i.e., for-

eign) forces if the reductions were "part of an integral program for the reduction of both stationed and indigenous forces." Following this NATO response, the issue lay dormant in Moscow until Brezhnev raised the subject of troop limitations in "Central Europe" as part of his "peace plan" in his report to the 24th Party Congress on 30 March 1971. This proved to be only the opening shot in a salvo on the issue. From that date, varying degrees of interest have been evident in speeches [redacted] by Soviet officials and in Russian propaganda media. 25X1

The sudden display of Soviet interest in mutual force reductions caught most of the allies off guard. Western proposals for force reductions had always appealed to the allies as a useful counter to Soviet calls for a security conference and as a way of fending off pressures for unilateral US troop cuts. Now, however, the alliance was faced with the prospect of actual negotiations before it had fully appraised the potential risks and advantages of force reductions, and before it had firm ideas of how they could be accomplished. The European allies were also perceptibly troubled by the specter of a bilateral dialogue on troop cuts between Washington and Moscow. They became sensitive to the fact that their future security situation could depend on the outcome of force reduction talks.

THE ROME CRITERIA


1. Mutual force reductions should be compatible with the Alliance's vital security interests and should not operate to the military disadvantage of either side;
2. Reductions should be reciprocal and phased and balanced as to their scope and timing;
3. Reductions should include both stationed (foreign) and indigenous forces and their weapons systems in the areas concerned;
4. There must be adequate verification and controls to ensure observance of agreements.

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Potential Force Reduction Areas



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At the NATO ministerial in Lisbon this June the allies, largely on the initiative of the US and Canada, moved nearer to agreement on the procedures for force reduction explorations. The US proposed, and the other allies agreed, that bilateral probes of Soviet attitudes should lead up to a meeting this fall of the allied deputy foreign ministers. This meeting would decide on the next moves, depending upon the outcome of the bilateral soundings. At Canadian urging, the allies also said that they would at some point nominate an emissary, representing the members of the alliance, to explore with the East prospects for actual negotiations. The allies also agreed to accelerate work on preparing substantive NATO positions.

Allied Attitudes Three Months After Lisbon

The allies have become increasingly nervous in the last three months about the minimal progress made toward establishing an agreed negotiating position. They expect and want the US to provide leadership for this undertaking. Each has distinct political, economic, and security interests at stake, however, which translate into a variety of positions regarding a desirable approach to force reductions.

The West Germans have for some time been the leading advocates of proposals for force reductions. Bonn's original support was based primarily on its view that such proposals, in addition to being a logical corollary of Ostpolitik, were useful as a Western counter to Soviet calls for a security conference. As pressures mounted in the US, however, for unilateral troop reductions in Europe, the Germans saw another important dimension. In a tactical sense, the proposals themselves could help stave off demands in the US for unilateral cuts. In the longer term, if US cuts prove inevitable, Bonn reasons, they might be matched by at least some cutbacks in the East. The West Germans are also very interested in negotiating reductions in indigenous as well as foreign forces, because of the economies Bonn could realize and to avoid a postreduction situa-

tion in which German troops would constitute an increased proportion of Western forces. 25X1

Bonn nevertheless is cautious.

This approach probably was intended, prior to the conclusion of the Four-Power phase of the Berlin talks, to postpone multilateral talks on force reductions until a Berlin accord was achieved. It probably is still viewed by Bonn as the most judicious course.

The British count themselves among the most skeptical students of mutual force reductions. Harold Wilson's Labor government had shown some enthusiasm about the role of force reduction proposals as NATO detente initiatives. The Heath government has emphasized within the last year, however, that any reductions that could be negotiated with the Soviet Union would detract from NATO's defense posture. The recent revelations of Soviet spy activities in the UK leading to London's expulsion of Soviet personnel can only reinforce British caution regarding European security questions. 25X1

London, in sum, believes that NATO must prepare itself for negotiations, although it is doubtful that a complete allied position can be reached soon.

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France, the third major European ally, has abstained from every formal signal on force reductions from NATO to the East. French abstention, until last year, was based primarily on the judgment that joining in such a signal would violate Paris' opposition in principle to bloc-to-bloc dealings. French substantive examination of the topic up until a year ago had resulted in little more than Defense Minister Debre's assertion that he found it "terribly boring." The French did not, in fact, believe that the Soviets would agree to negotiate mutual troop cuts.

As diplomatic activity on force reductions increased in the last year, the French have begun to devote more serious attention to the subject.



Manlio Brosio

Secretary general of NATO from August 1964 until his retirement this month, Brosio is unanimously respected for his skillful service to the Alliance. Prior to his NATO assignment, Brosio's diplomatic career included duty as Italian ambassador to the US, France, and the USSR. Brosio, now 74 years old, remains a vigorous defender of the Atlantic Alliance and an advocate of close Western defense cooperation. He speaks fluent English as well as French and Russian—abilities that further enhance his qualifications to lead the NATO MBFR mission to Moscow.

The outcome of this effort has been a French assessment that any kind of troop reductions, whether unilateral US cuts or mutual cuts with the East, might lead to lessened military preparedness throughout Western Europe and a concomitant increase in the political influence of the Soviet Union. Paris argues that such reductions should come only after there have been more substantive improvements in the East-West political climate, improvements that Paris argues could at least partially be realized through a Conference on European Security.

The French position is motivated also by a desire to occupy a distinct position on detente questions among the Western powers, particularly to obtain greater leverage vis-a-vis West Germany. Paris would rather direct attention toward a security conference—an area of detente politics where, so far, it is ahead of Bonn. A long-range French consideration must be that an agreement on force reductions would both imply greater explicit reliance on the US nuclear shield and require some form of more integrated common European defense system—corollaries that Paris is reluctant to accept at the present time.

The further that East and West move toward negotiations, however, the more of an anomaly the French position will become. The Soviet Union may very well insist that French forces in Germany be included in any reduction formula and Paris may not be comfortable occupying a blocking position on such an important area of East-West deliberations.

Recognizing that its interests are involved in allied discussions of force reductions, Paris has decided to be represented by an observer at the meeting next week of deputy foreign ministers.

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Most of the smaller allies realize that their leverage is limited. They are nevertheless assessing more thoroughly the potential impact of force reductions on their interests. A coalition of southern allies—Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Portugal—is emerging to oppose any expansion of the geographical coverage to include their territory. Their concern is not so much that their forces would be included, but that limitations might be placed on the US presence in the Mediterranean. Norway and Denmark, on the other hand, apparently are not opposed to discussions involving reductions in the Nordic area.

The Meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers

When the deputy ministers meet next week, the allies will select Manlio Brosio, now retired as NATO's secretary general, to explore prospects with the East on behalf of the members of the alliance (except France). Brosio has said that he will accept the call. He will be supported on his mission by a small staff of three or four experts. His first and most important stop undoubtedly will be Moscow. As for the rest of his itinerary, the allies agree that he should not visit East Germany unless all three phases of the Berlin negotiations have been concluded although some stops in Eastern Europe are anticipated. Many allies think that means also will have to be found to accommodate the interests of the neutral and non-aligned European countries.

The most difficult task for the allies has been to work out instructions, or a mandate, for the explorer. The allies agree that he should not attempt to negotiate or appear to invite negotiations. They will direct Brosio to explain the views of the allied countries on principles of force reductions, sound out his interlocutors regarding their intentions, and explore the possibility of finding common ground on principles. The sticking point, however, has been to obtain allied agreement on these principles and to decide how far the explorer should go in discussing each element of them. Brosio is not happy with what now appears to be a very limited substantive mandate,

but he probably does not expect it to be expanded greatly at the high-level meeting.

MBFR Principles

Since the Lisbon ministerial the allies have attempted to develop agreed positions on the main substantive features of a mutual and balanced reduction of forces. Major differences among the allies and the lack of definitive US positions, however, have prevented agreement in some areas and have led to only vague formulations in others.

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Area for Reductions: [] this summer, Italy, Denmark, and the Netherlands supported the US preference for an area including Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East and West Germany. These countries were specified by Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki in his European disarmament proposals dating from 1958. West Germany, however, would prefer not being isolated on the Western side of the reduction area and strongly favors the "NATO Guidelines Area," which adds Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg to the Rapacki area. Bonn has been supported by the UK, Turkey, Luxembourg, and Belgium, the last preferring also to add Hungary on the Eastern side. Now, only the Dutch appear to be holding out for the Rapacki area. Bonn's concern therefore may lead the allies to accept the NATO guidelines area as the basis for Brosio's mandate, although other options will probably not be precluded from future consideration.

Possible Extension of Geographic Coverage: As already noted, the southern flank allies would prefer that their area be explicitly excluded from reductions. Denmark and Norway have continued to favor the possibility that the reduction area might at some point be expanded to cover the northern flank. Brosio probably will be permitted to leave open the possibility of some eventual expansion of the area of coverage beyond central Europe.

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Types of Forces to Be Reduced: Most of the allies, particularly West Germany, prefer a position that envisages reductions in both stationed and indigenous forces. The US has expressed an interest in emphasizing reductions in stationed forces, and Brosio's mandate will probably direct him to express an interest in both types with the proviso that stationed forces "could" be emphasized.

Disposition of Withdrawn Forces: The allies agreed that the explorer should not discuss whether the "foreign" forces, once withdrawn, would have to be disbanded. Brosio, however, has pointed out that if NATO insists that Soviet units be disbanded, Moscow would counter with the same requirements for withdrawn US forces.

Naval Forces: The southern flank allies would like specifically to exclude reductions in naval forces, fearing eventual Soviet demands for cutbacks in the US Sixth Fleet. Brosio will probably not discuss this subject in his explorations but will be guided by the general rule that as long as reductions are limited to Central Europe, naval forces should not be included.

Nuclear Weapons: Although there is no clear allied position on nuclear weapons, Brosio probably will be able to tell the Soviets that they have not been excluded from consideration.

Categories of Forces: Brosio would like to have definitive guidance on whether combat aircraft, tanks, and nuclear delivery systems could be included. There are differences among the allies on this point. He will probably be authorized to say that such weapons have not been specifically excluded.

Verification: The allies are split between the US and Canada—who oppose requiring any on-site inspection—and a number of European allies, who feel that the posing of such a requirement would serve as a good negotiating tactic. Belgium has also noted that on-site inspection would be necessary for the "tranquility" of allies that do not

have unilateral inspection capabilities. This split may persist and Brosio probably will be able to say only that any agreement should have some effective means of monitoring or constraining the movement of forces.

Participants in Negotiations: The allies agree that the negotiating forum should be effective, flexible, and manageable. They also agree that participation would be most effective if limited to states within the reduction area, or to those having forces in it, but they recognize that participation could expand to include some neutrals as well as all NATO and Warsaw Pact members.

Relationship of MBFR to CES: The allies remain highly uncertain about how to relate the timing of force reduction talks and those pertaining to a conference on European security. If negotiations on the former should start first, there is allied agreement that they should be set up in such a way that they could later be placed under a European security umbrella. A security conference could conceivably place force reductions on its agenda and endorse any agreements sent to it. If, on the other hand, a security conference should take place first, the alliance could still attempt to place force reductions on the agenda and preserve a link between the two.

What Reception in Moscow?

Although the Soviets would prefer not having an ex - secretary general of NATO as the explorer, they are likely to accept him and listen with interest to what he says. They will certainly not appoint a Warsaw Pact official to handle the talks in Moscow and Eastern Europe but will emphasize that the talks are between Brosio and individual countries. Moscow obviously wishes to avoid granting NATO, as an institution, a formal role in disarmament and detente. In addition, the noninstitutional approach would leave Moscow greater flexibility regarding eventual Eastern representation at negotiations on force reduction.

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Both in the talks with Brosio and in future bilateral contacts, the Soviets will be likely to raise points where they believe the US is vulnerable (for instance, regarding the US military presence in Italy and Spain). In fact, Gromyko has told Ambassador Beam that Moscow did not limit its view to central Europe. Nevertheless, to the extent that the Soviets really are interested in troop reductions, that is where they will continue to focus.

The evolving Soviet line was recently relayed to US officials by a first secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. He confirmed Soviet emphasis on "the central region" and stated that this comprised at a minimum the two Germanies. He confirmed statements by other Soviet officials that weapons systems as well as personnel ought to be discussed and that discussions should be between the individual states involved in the area of reductions and not between blocs. He also confirmed that each side should decide on the proportion and choice of its national components to be reduced, adding that Moscow is currently thinking of reductions in all force components (army, navy, air) and of reductions of indigenous as well as foreign troops. He reiterated that Moscow does not presently feel that talks on troop reductions need to be directly connected with a security conference.

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There are several reasons to expect continued Soviet interest in force reduction talks. In the first place, the current Soviet detente policy centers on Europe—a primary area of concern to Moscow. Force reductions constitute an obvious part of this detente policy. Moscow has considerably more troops than it needs for internal security in Eastern Europe and would probably be more than willing to pull a number of them back to the USSR in return for a significant lessening of the US military presence in Europe. The So-

viets know that there is strong sentiment in the US for American troop withdrawals from Europe and probably also feel that the subject is divisive within NATO. They probably judge that pressure on this issue can exacerbate both situations. In addition, discussions of troop reductions will eventually have to include Pankow and thus contribute to the important Soviet objective of gaining formal recognition of East Germany. It could also provide a forum for Moscow to raise the subject of US forward-based nuclear delivery systems in Europe, and perhaps open possibilities for the reduction of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

On the debit side, Moscow must always be concerned with the risk that a detente atmosphere in Europe will make it more difficult to exercise control of its East European empire, particularly if such an atmosphere removes much of the credibility of the eternal Moscow bogeyman of West German revanchism. The Soviets cannot be certain that involving the East European countries in such specific detente activities as mutual force reductions and a Conference on European Security will not whet their appetites for more independent and productive contacts with the West.

With all this in mind, Moscow has been carefully vague about details of its thinking on force reductions, obviously hoping to receive Western views before showing its cards.

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In the talks with Brosio, Moscow will likely maintain that his position is not sufficiently forthcoming and will continue to press the West to speed up its activity while offering few more details on what the Soviets have in mind. The Soviets obviously would derive satisfaction if they could appear out in front on this issue. They may

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ultimately present a formal demarche to US and West European capitals calling for discussions within a specified time on force reductions in order to create the impression that the NATO countries are dragging their feet.

Outlook

The deputy foreign ministers' meeting is not expected to produce major surprises, but it will mark another Western step toward force reduction negotiations: The alliance [] is ill-prepared for any such negotiations. Most of the allies generally feel that they are committed, nevertheless, to pursue the subject because it is their "baby." They may also feel pressed by the expectation of their publics that the West will keep the initiative in the East-West dialogue on force reductions. As long as important US decisions remain outstanding, the allies

will be disturbed by a lack of direction in their work at a time when they see an accelerating movement toward negotiations. They will remain dismayed not so much because they are zealous advocates of force reductions, but because they suspect that this may contribute to pressures for unilateral cuts in US forces.

Brosio's mission to Moscow may not reveal a great deal more about Soviet intentions. It will, however, buy time for the allies to sort out their own ideas on the subject. They realize that by the time of their ministerial meeting in December, a conclusion of the second and third phases of the Berlin negotiations may face them with little choice but to authorize multilateral talks to lead to a Conference on European Security. Whether, upon receiving the report of the explorer's mission, they will be ready and willing to move also to talks on troop reductions may prove to be a troublesome question for the allies. []

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